Head picture photography|高婧婧Through the phone, Wang Mo can feel their nervousness in the sales of the first-line market, especially the close attention of Huawei.
At one time, high profits drove offline dealers to concentrate more resources on Ov, which explains why the Ov brand quickly occupied offline channels in the past few years and dominated the sales charts.
"Old rivers and lakes" Wang Mo and manyMobile phoneThe regional leaders of the brand are often commensurate with their brothers. The relationship with the dealer often determines the distance between the mobile phone manufacturer and the market, because the manufacturer can obtain the first-hand sales data from the dealer in the first time, and timely adjust the shipment volume and market strategy.
Each store of Wang Mo has an average monthly sales volume of about 1,000 units. In the event of festival promotions and other activities, the monthly sales volume can exceed 2,000 units. Among them, Huawei brand (Huawei, glory) sales can account for 30%, Ov (OPPO, vivo) each accounted for 25%, and Xiaomi is within 5%.
“Ov mobile phones have always been two brands with higher profits.” Wang Mo introduced to “Chinese Entrepreneur”. “In general, the profit of selling an Ov mobile phone is between 500 and 700 yuan. But in the past two years, Huawei's profits to distributors are catching up and even surpassing Ov. The profit of each newly-launched Huawei P30 mobile phone is more than 600 yuan, and the profit of Huawei P30 Porsche is as high as 2,000 yuan."
Photography: Shi Xiaobing
However, after Huawei introduced the “Thousand County Plan” in 2015, the offline layout of Huawei has been expanding and it has already touched the red line of Ov. This terrible latecomer is in the offline channel of the Red Sea, tearing open a mouth.
I am used to the ups and downs of the communication market, witnessed the glory of Nokia and Motorola, and also experienced the confusion when Xiaomi proposed the Internet model. Wang Mo found that the offline channels have never been as diverse as they are now, and he has to force himself to learn. New business model and focus on market dynamics.
In fact, both dealers and mobile phone manufacturers are very clear that the offline channel has once again become a new battlefield, but the dividends here are no longer, only close combat.
Battle that cannot be lost
Time to return to 2013.
Huawei's smartphone business has just started. Huawei's consumer business CEO Yu Chengdong went to a county to investigate the market. At that time, the dealer's store was filled with OPPO, Samsung and Lenovo. There were very few Huawei vendors, and Huawei stores were even more difficult. Yu Chengdong is very emotional: OPPO's specialty store area is only 10 square meters, but in a prominent position on the street, consumers want to visit the mobile phone store will soon think of it to find it.
In the offline market, the channel structure of mobile phone manufacturers generally has four cores: one isGome,SuningLocal credit chain stores such as Dixintong and Music Language; secondly, retail and service systems brought by manufacturers, such as flagship stores, experience stores and specialty stores; third, government and enterprise customers, customized services for corporate customers; fourth, with operators Cooperation, this part of the cooperation is almost related to all channels, is a supporting module.
The offline market is a battle that cannot be lost.
In 2015, Huawei, which sold more than 100 million units, immediately shouted the slogan of the “Thousand County Plan”, which will build a physical store covering 1,000 counties on the basis of a 100% increase in monopoly and authorized brand stores in the past year. . The sub-brand glory that Huawei separated from, originally targeted the Internet online channel, and the benchmark Xiaomi, also quietly followed the footsteps.
Huawei's “Thousand County Plan” reached its goal in 2017. At that time, Huawei had 531 experience stores at the prefecture-level level, and the number of county-level experience stores reached 1,556. The offline layout of glory is concentrated in the “waist”, that is, the third- and fourth-tier cities. This means that Huawei has deployed the offline channels in all aspects.
Zhao Ming, president of Glory, revealed to the "Chinese Entrepreneur" that after 2015, glory began to cooperate with offline partners in the light asset model. After four years of quiet penetration, the sales ratio of glory online and offline markets has reached 1:1.
Huawei's assault directly ignited the warfare of mobile phone offline channels.
In 2016, Ov began to counterattack and launched a “people's war”—that is, joint-size dealers, carpet-laying stores, gathering outdoor portals, billboards and other traditional communication resources, in the stores of Huawei, Samsung and Apple. Blocking a bloody road. The "People's War" miraculous effect appeared, and Ov even copied this tactic to the expansion of overseas markets.
This year, mobile phone manufacturers are fiercely competitive, but they are also growing gratifying. Market research firm International Data Corporation (IDC) data show that in the fourth quarter of 2016, shipments of the entire Chinese smartphone market increased by 18.7% year-on-year, and OPPO, Huawei and vivo accounted for 18.1%, 16.9% and 16% respectively. Top three.
The biggest increase is OPPO. It is the 4th place in the fourth quarter of 2015. The name of vivo is also rushed from the 5th to the top 3 within one year. In 2015, the top three millet is lost. Offline, the market share is only 7.4%, ranking behind Apple, ranking fifth.In 2017, Xiaomi slowed down and began to “recover lost soil”. Xiaomi, who had previously focused on online channels, realized the importance of offline, and began to lay out the millet home and new retail system in the domestic market. At this time, the advantages of the huge ecological chain company system immediately appeared, and the abundant IoT products continued to bring traffic to offline stores. Xiao Jun, the founder, chairman and CEO of Xiaomi, has been exposed many times in the offline store of Friends of the company. But not all dealers welcome this special customer. According to the product review of the product, in August 2017, the Ov dealers collectively stated that if they saw the Lei Jun who was “stabbing the military situation”, they would adopt the “three noes” principle of not welcoming, ignoring and not accepting.
However, the "humble" Lei Jun still led Xiaomi to make a comeback in the domestic mobile phone market. According to IDC data, in the Chinese market in 2017, millet sales were 55.1 million units, with a market share of 12.4%, ranking fourth. In 2016, Xiaomi was overtaken by competitors, with sales falling 36% year-on-year and selling only 41.5 million mobile phones.
Ov's offline advantage continues in 2018. OPPO and vivo respectively took the sales of 78.94 million units and 75.97 million units to the top of the Chinese smartphone market. However, the glory is coming to the forefront, surpassing Xiaomi and "big brother" Huawei ranks third.
War is inevitable
Zhao Ming gave a feeling at the glory 20i conference on April 17th: "This year is a year when the wind and grass manufacturers and mobile phone manufacturers forced the bottom line." In 2019, a mobile phone lined down the rivers and lakes, a fierce battle is inevitable.
According to the sales statistics of 10034 offline mobile phone stores covering 25 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions in China, in February 2019, China’s mobile phone offline market accounted for 80% of the total mobile phone market in China. However, in the same period, China's overall mobile phone offline market completed sales of 23.07 million units, down 26% year-on-year.
In the face of a severely shrinking market, what kind of killer will mobile phone manufacturers sacrifice?
Wang Mo, who has been soaked in the communication market for many years, said that Xiaomi’s mobile phone is still unable to give dealers too much profit space based on the Internet and cost-effective genes. Only Xiaomi’s home can’t reach enough channel volume. In the future, Xiaomi may only rely on technological breakthroughs. .
However, Xiaomi's offline layout is stepping up. As of December 31, 2018, Xiaomi has set up 1,378 authorized stores, set up more than 38,000 franchised stores and direct supply points in the township-level market; established 586 millet homes, mainly Distributed in first-, second-, and third-tier cities. Xiaomi Online authorized stores and other sales outlets copied the model of Xiaomi Home. In the mobile phone stores in a fourth-tier city in the west, the reporter saw Xiaomi displaying a large number of eco-chain products.
Glory is also pouring profits into offline channels. Wang Mo introduced that in the past, the profit of each mobile phone that gave the dealers was about 200 yuan, and now it can reach 400~500 yuan. According to the data given by glory, as of September 30, 2018, the glory mobile experience store has exceeded 1001.
In addition, in 2019, the original focus on the “waist” third- and fourth-line market glory, its offline layout began to turn to the core business district of the first-tier cities, more and more young people to the Shopping Mall, here to talk about the experience of eating, drinking and shopping integration. "You will see that the recent glory of this offline layout in first- and second-tier cities is very fast." Zhao Ming told China Entrepreneur.
Huawei's official data shows that Huawei's offline service franchise stores have reached 1,200, and will reach nearly 1,500 by the end of 2019, covering more than 95% of China's prefecture-level cities; Huawei's city-level experience stores have exceeded 1,000, and will increase in 2019. At about 1,500, the county-level experience stores have exceeded 2,500, and by the end of 2019, it is expected to reach 3,000, covering more than 95% of China's counties.
The offline channel is the advantage barrier that Ov used to have. Huawei broke into the wall and Xiaomi took another path.
Indeed, in the mobile phone business districts of third- and fourth-tier cities and even townships, you can see an Ov store in just a dozen steps. Selling mobile phones on the first floor, foils on the second floor, and operator services are standard on these stores. Ov vigorously spread the goods by giving the dealers a high profit, which not only did not bring cost pressure to Ov, but gained huge profits.
However, with the efforts of Huawei and Xiaomi in the third- and fourth-tier markets, Ov clearly felt the pressure and must break through.
OPPO and vivo have always had a strong and persistent desire for the first and second tier markets. At the end of 2017, Shanghai Huaihai Zhong Road No. 688, OPPO's first super flagship store officially opened to welcome customers, the second and third super flagship stores have also been in Shenzhen Huaqiang North and Beijing Wukesong Huaxi LIVE business; early 2019, vivo It officially announced that nine new image of vivo smart flagship stores in Shanghai, Chongqing and Hangzhou will be opened simultaneously in the core business districts of eight major cities across the country.
Photography: Shi Xiaobing
Unlike the Ov stores that are crowded in the streets of the third- and fourth-tier cities, these spaces full of design and fashion elements are not for sale, designed to enhance the user experience and brand image.
OPPO retail director Bian Haoyu told the "Chinese Entrepreneur": "OPPO has built a clear pyramid channel system, from top to bottom for super flagship stores, flagship stores, experience stores and specialty stores, each level has its own side Focus.” Currently OPPO has entered nearly 300 shopping centers in first- and second-tier cities, and it is expected to complete nearly 2,000 shopping centers in 2020.
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A medium-sized mobile phone store, the cost of rent decoration and so on is about 1 million to 3 million yuan. In the good year of the market, Wang Mo’s stores earned a total of 4 million to 5 million a year. "But these two years, the money is actually not good to earn, only earn 2 million to 3 million a year."
Wang Mo recalled that when smartphones are best sold, they should be around 2014, and they can make money by selling a mobile phone in almost a store. “It’s not so easy to do mobile phone distribution now.” Wang Mo said with emotion, “not only must we constantly pay attention to market trends, understand industry trends, but also continue to learn and improve in store operations and retail thinking.”
Zhang Yun is also facing changes. She is responsible for running an OPPO store near Yanjiao Pedestrian Street. Girls are not interested in the terms of mobile phone parameters, performance, etc., but in order to better introduce the product to the user, she has already reversed the configuration, functions and features of the OPPO models.
Photography: Liang Ruiyao
Zhang Yun told "Chinese Entrepreneur" that she started to operate mobile phone stores in 2013. Now the price of OPPO mobile phones is more favorable than in previous years. After listening to Zhang Yun’s patience and professional explanations, many old users will Continue to choose OPPO. However, I have to admit that the purchaser will always compare the OPPO hot-selling model with the Huawei hot-selling model in the past two years.
To survive, we must change. This is a required question.
Yan Tao, general manager of sales of OPPO China Business Department, told China Entrepreneur that from the perspective of the entire offline retail format, after the rapid development of previous years, offline users have changed from the purely demand for products. For the overall and complete service plan, OPPO offline stores should shift from sales to service.
What is a service store?
Yan Tao introduced that before the user came to the store to buy a mobile phone, the relationship between the brand and the user was completed during the transaction. But now users and brands are in a life-cycle relationship. In addition to mobile phones, users also need mobile phone foils, as well as consultations on the use of the purchase process, and evenTrade-inThe appeal.
At the same time as adding upwards, OPPO's offline layout is still doing subtraction.
Yan Tao introduced that OPPO had only tens of thousands of points of sale in the country in the early days, and later developed to 250,000 points of sale. But now they find that under the current system, some points of sale will be concentrated in the user, so the small form of sales itself does not have much room for survival.
The tightening of the bottom channel is a natural selection process. The establishment of the super flagship store carries more ambitions.
OPPO does not have a clear KPI for the super flagship store. Counterpoint Research Director Yan Zhanmeng analyzed the "Chinese Entrepreneur". OPPO's super flagship store in the first-tier cities is not to sell mobile phones, but to serve as a service. It relies on services to reverse its image and enhance brand stickiness.
Huawei and glory have gradually established the image of “core technology research and development”; Xiaomi’s “fans” marketing has attracted a batch of diehard technology powder, and the layout of the ecological chain has also made more extensions for its technology update; in contrast, lack The core technology, the OPPO that uses massive star spokesperson marketing, wants to completely tear off the label of the "factory machine".
A flagship store that allows users to directly experience the product is much more intuitive than the promotion of "black technology" at the press conference.
Jiang Meilan, the founder &CEO of mobile marketing solutions provider, said in an interview with "Chinese Entrepreneur": "Foreign consumers have a consumption habit called 'ROPO', ie 'Research Online, Purchase Offline' - - Online research offline purchase. There is also 'ROPO' in China, just Research Offline, Purchase Online, which is offline experience online purchase, which means offline stores are necessary for mobile phone companies."
According to Fei Yi Interactive's research, sales on a brand online can generally account for up to 25% of the overall sales, and the remaining 75% need to be achieved through offline channels. More importantly, the improvement of conversion rate, trust, and brand reputation by offline stores is impossible on the line.
The battle will continue. However, the market share counterattack miracle has been difficult to happen, the mobile phone market is concentrated to the head manufacturers, and the living space of SMEs is once again squeezed. In the T-shaped market form, the barriers between the head manufacturers are blurred, and the competition begins to be a real sword.