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A silent hymn: Why do people like and support Huawei so much?

via:博客园     time:2018/12/14 15:38:29     readed:554


Text / Dai boss

Data support: Yuanchuan Research

Source: Fan Tong Dai boss (ID: worldofboss)

In 1997, Ren Zhengfei felt that Huawei was a little bit uncontrollable.

In this year, Huawei's sales revenue was 4.1 billion yuan, ranking among the top 10 in China's top 100 electronics companies. The company employs more than 5,600 people. Although the six deputy professors of Renren helped Ren Zhengfei draft the "Huawei Basic Law", this "management outline" cannot play the role of rules and procedures. In this company of ten years of development, R&D and market are heavily dependent on “ Technical heroes & rdquo; and "Firefighting Captain", which makes Ren Zhengfei feel stretched and unable to do so.

In terms of R&D, although there are many cattle like Zheng Baoyong and Li Yinan, Huawei's research and development is still at the primary level of combat with big brothers and brethren, there is no mature R&D process and decision-making. Mechanism, which led the market department to arbitrarily agree to the needs of customers, the R & D department was busy with the troubles, the products made were repeatedly tossed and modified, the company's product version once more than 1,000, management confusion, and extremely low efficiency.

Manufacturing and sales are also a mess. After the front desk sales got the order, it was only dumbfounded when I returned to the company. It was found that the factory could not produce it at all, which resulted in Huawei's timely delivery rate of only 50%, while foreign competitors reached 94%. Li Yinan, who is in charge of the China Research Institute, is tired of coping with customers' new demands and complaints every day, and the R&D supervisor of a product line is even more exaggerated. Every day, the customer and marketing department calls are mad, and the monthly telephone bill can cost more than 6,000. Block [3].

In the 1990s, after the cancellation of the package allocation, countless graduates flocked to the southeast coast, and a large number of technical staff from state-owned research institutes also jumped out of the system. In several office buildings in Nanshan, Huawei has interviewed and reported young people from Tiannanhaibei every day. Some of them are dragging their shackles, some are carrying their childishness, and they are holding their border defense cards. "The basic route for a hundred years without wavering", the squares and streets of the posters, came to the hot land of Shenzhen.

How to make this increasingly large talent team into a scientific and technological force capable of large-scale collective operations is a difficult problem for Ren Zhengfei. One week before Christmas 1997, he decided to go to the United States for a turn.

This is not the first time he has gone to the United States. In 1992, Ren Zhengfei and Zheng Baoyong and others first went abroad, and they went to the United States. At that time, he wore a rustic suit, and his pocket was stuffed with 50,000 US dollars in tolls, from New York to Silicon Valley, from Boston to Dallas, and in the United States for ten days. After feeling the power of capitalism in all aspects, this once "learning the standard" has profoundly realized that there are too many things worth learning in the United States.

Going to the United States at the end of 1997, the purpose is clear: to learn from the best companies. Ren Zhengfei and his team visited four high-tech companies, Hughes Electronics, Lucent Technologies, Hewlett-Packard and IBM. The biggest gain came from IBM. CEO Gerstner gave up the Christmas holiday and led the high-level reception of Ren Zhengfei. It took a whole day to introduce Huawei's management system to Huawei.

Louis · Louis Gerstner is only two years older than Ren Zhengfei. He has just saved the huge and rigid IBM from a quagmire through drastic management reforms. This is a story tailored for Ren Zhengfei. Ren Zhengfei, who is worried that Huawei can't break through the management bottleneck, was impressed by the IPD (Integrated Product Development) R&D management model demonstrated by IBM executives. At that time, he made up his mind:Regardless of how much it costs, let Huawei learn this set of things.

IBM's offer is also unceremonious: sending 70 consultants to Huawei, each hour from $300 to $680 per person, stationed for 5 years, hands-on teaching, the total account counts down at least 2 billion yuan for Huawei! It took 2 billion yuan to set up a R&D management system, which undoubtedly subverted the cognition of the Chinese enterprise at that time, but Ren Zhengfei insisted on it, and even the counter-offer was saved [7]. He also asked his colleagues who advised him to pay the price: You cut the price. Can I be responsible for the risks of the project?

On August 29, 1998, Ren Zhengfei held a mobilization swearing-in meeting. More than 50 IBM consultants in suits and suits were stationed in Huawei. More than 300 business backbones were drawn from R&D, marketing, production, finance and other departments, only to cooperate with foreign consultants. work. At the conference, Ren Zhengfei announced that Huawei would focus on three management transformation projects, including IPD (Integrated Product Development) and ISC (Integrated Supply Chain), in the 3 to 5 years. He patted the table and shouted: Whoever resists change, he has to Leave Huawei!

The conference is filled with tragic growth. Most of the backbones that have been transferred, the promotion and development routes have been interrupted, and even the posts have been replaced, and their hearts are buried with dissatisfaction; most executives do not understand the foreigners’ finger pointing, thinking that they will only talk on paper; and the large number of grassroots employees There are also grievances, and their assessment and workload have increased a lot. The company that has been in business for a decade has already had circles and hills. They are like a wall of gas, blocking any change.

At this point in 1998, no one could predict the outcome.


Ren Zhengfei, who was in trouble during the ten years of turmoil, was implicated because of his father. He was basically insulated from meritorious deeds. One of the few honors he won was called ““Study Chairman Mao's work”.

This glory full of historical dust is rarely mentioned by himself, but he can find traces in almost all his speeches. Even the headlines of many speeches, such as "How long can Huawei's red flag play?", have strong Hair style. In his various articles, there is also a strong sense of mashup: there are English terms such as IPD, ISC, LTE, 4G/5G, etc., and there are also "attacking the hills" & rdquo; "front line rear" & rdquo; & ldquo; The countryside goes to the revolutionary vocabulary.

Therefore, he knows how to use the No. 3 character to check and balance the No. 2 character, how to use self-criticism to suppress the cadre ambitions, how to use the rotation system to disintegrate localism, and how to prevent the princes from becoming bigger &hellip in the way of “five horses into Beijing” ;… These means are not difficult to understand for Ren Zhengfei, who is familiar with the four volumes of Mao Xuan. Many entrepreneurs born in the 40s and 60s, Mao's writings are their enlightenment textbooks on foreign strategy and internal power. From Zong Qinghou to Shi Yuzhu, Ren Zhengfei is not the only one.

However, after realizing the crisis of Huawei, Ren Zhengfei gave up the traditional Chinese entrepreneurs.Progressive improvementwithMedical foot pasteThe method, he decided to directly on the body brake knife, worship the most advanced company at that time as a division, let Huawei completely become a modern company. Of course, before accomplishing this goal, he needs to use his supreme founder's status and use the autocratic iron fist to push Huawei to the modern track. This seems to be split, but it is all in the history.

Huawei's R&D management system at the time was designed by the veteran Zheng Bao. “Troika” architecture: The Strategic Planning Office was responsible for deciding “what to do with the product”, and the China Research Department was responsible for “putting the product” & quot; The department is responsible for testing the feedback & ldquo; product is good & rdquo;. This system is very efficient in the early stage of operation. As long as the strategic direction is successful, it can quickly produce products for the market. Huawei's early “double doubling every year” relies on this simple and rough system.

However, before and after 1997, Huawei's failure in CT2 (commonly known as "two brothers") and DECT (an internal communication network) made Ren Zhengfei realize that the system had a problem. This kind of keenness is not for everyone. One analogy is that when Huawei decided to launch the IPD, ZTE just built the R&D system into a structure similar to the “troika” in January 1998. The huge gap in the future of the two companies has been buried at this time.

The introduction of IBM's IPD management system almost reinvented the original system. From 1998 to 2003, Huawei entered the period of intensive institutional reform: first "liberate thoughts", set off “ truth discussion", through the removal of cadres to Liwei, and then delineated & ldquo; SAR pilot & rdquo;, finally popularized Company-wide. The book "Huawei R&D" once described [3]: Huawei's R&D system reform path is completely in accordance with Deng Xiaoping's model of China's reform and opening up.

This is roughly the basics, and can be used as a textbook for Chinese companies to promote internal process changes:

Emancipating the mind: In response to the incomprehension of a group of veteran cadres and the wait-and-see attitude of grassroots employees, Ren Zhengfei has become the biggest “drummer”, constantly emphasizing the importance of IPD in various occasions, even using politicized statements: “ Determined to wear a pair of American shoes, then we can't sway. If we swing today and swing like this tomorrow, we will accomplish nothing.So be steadfast in learning from IBM and concentrate on learning from IBM, not swinging.

Opening to the outside world: Huawei from 1998 to 2003 was an extremely open Huawei, and it opened its doors to consultant IBM. In order to gain the attention of IBM headquarters, Ren Zhengfei was in a row to replace all the servers and business software purchased by Huawei with IBM; he even vacated a half-floor office building, decorated in an American style, with coffee machines, refrigerators and microwave ovens. Even the toilet was changed from a squat to a toilet [9], ensuring that foreign consultants can feel at home when they eat and drink.

Reforming Liwei: Ren Zhengfei is deeply squatting. After the political line is determined, the cadre is the reason for the decision. Therefore, he consciously uses the Thunder method to stand up. A chief engineer of the product department joined the IPD project team and found that the workload was very large. He was afraid to influence his performance and promotion and left. The IBM consultants reported that the company immediately downgraded the chief engineer to take effect. In the future, even the negative IPD reform will be deducted from the assessment.

SAR pilot: IPD's full name for Integrated Product Development is a cross-departmental cooperation system that combines R&D, marketing, procurement, manufacturing, and finance in the product development phase, avoiding the single-player development of the R&D department. In the case of fighting, it is very important to understand why Huawei is arrogant. Interested readers can refer to Chapter 3 of Huawei Management Transformation and Chapter 13 of Huawei R&D, which will not be repeated here.

Under the guidance of IBM consultants, Huawei selected three product lines for piloting. On May 17, 2000, Huawei's wireless business unit's large-capacity mobile switch VMSC6.0 product was used as the first pilot of IPD, using 10 The monthly cycle runs through the entire process, and the other two products are subsequently completed. Huawei employees were surprised to find that IBM's approach worked well, and despite the cumbersome process, the total product development cycle was reduced by about 50%.

Full replication: The pilot of the wireless business unit was successful, just like the “Shenzhen experience”, it began to replicate within Huawei like a wildfire. At the beginning of 2001, Huawei summarized the pilot experience and launched the IPD system version 1.0. By 2002, 50% of the projects were included in the IPD system. Later, Huawei introduced versions 2.0 and 3.0. By the end of 2003, almost 100% of the projects were adopted. The IPD system. After five years of self-revolution, the entire company's research and development system has been reborn.

The motive of this change was compiled into a paragraph by Huawei's old employees: At the end of 1997, Ren Zhengfei changed a BMW 730 and drove to take a ride. On the road, he met IBM boss Gerstner. Ren Zhengfei yelled at him: “Opened BMW.” ? ” Gerstner ignored. After a round, I met Gerstner and shouted: "Did a BMW?" ” The third time I met and shouted, Gerstner asked: "Do you have a fart?" ” Ren Zhengfei said anxiously: “No, no, I want to ask, where is the brake of this BMW?? ”

This paragraph is purely invented, but it reflects a truth: the IPD system and the subsequent supply chain, manpower, financial and other systems, let Ren Zhengfei master the ability to control giant chariots, and let Huawei have the ability to grow to a global level The institutional framework of the enterprise. After 1998, these unrecognized institutional reforms are the key to Huawei's ability to attack the city, not the technical heroes, overtime culture, and the simple style of queuing in the middle of the night.

However, in 1998-2003, the benefits of institutional reforms remained in the PPT of foreign consultants, and the communication rivers outside the company had long been surrounded by wolves. During this time, Huawei and Ren Zhengfei were in the most difficult winter.

2. Cold wave

In 2003, Huawei employee Fan Siyong flew to Burundi, an African country. He was shocked to find that the airport customs were empty and realized that the country had just started a civil war. In the evening, he hid in the hotel's toilet and slept with the rumble of gunfire outside the window.

Fan Siyong's experience was the epitome of thousands of Huawei employees overseas. These Chinese people who went overseas, in addition to the difficult local customers and powerful Western counterparts, there are the humid rain forests of South America, the rugged mountain roads of Africa, the dry sands of the Middle East, the daggers of robbers and the bombs of terrorists. At the same time that China joined the WTO in 2001 and became the world's factory, Huawei sent a large number of engineers and sales representatives to the world to make business difficult.

The reason why Huawei went to the sea to look for opportunities at this time is not unrelated to the failure of the domestic market.

1998-2002 was the most competitive period in the Chinese communications market. China Mobile was investing heavily in 2G (GSM route), which released huge amounts of investment each year, but these investments were basically taken in by foreign companies such as Ericsson, Motorola and Nokia. Huawei has developed GSM products in 1998, but it is not mature enough to break into key markets.

More crucially, Western rivals have begun to completely circumvent Huawei. They have learned from the "fixed China" market that the fixed-line telephone market has been defeated. As long as Huawei and ZTE develop a certain product, they will jointly reduce the price significantly (if Without domestic equipment, they will continue to sell high prices) to block the two companies from taking orders. At that time, a mobile GSM expansion of Guangdong Mobile, orders reached as high as 10 billion, Huawei can not grab a dime.

The house leaks were affected by the night rain. During this time, Ren Zhengfei also made three wrong judgments:

First, CDMA (China Unicom 2G route) was abandoned too early, and it has been bet GSM (mobile 2G route). As a result, GSM could not break through the containment of companies such as Ericsson. Only some of the marginal provinces received some orders, and domestic revenues could only be forced to go overseas to find markets. When I heard that Unicom had to invest in CDMA, it was too late, and it lost in the 2001-2002 Unicom bidding.

Second, missed "Little Smart" & quoquo; over the tens of billions of markets. Ren Zhengfei has always been contemptuous of “PHS technology”, ignoring the ardent desire of China Telecom to enter the mobile market through PHS technology, and personally vetoed the “Little Smart” project.UT StarcomThe sudden emergence of a different army, this is a major mistake that has been pursued "customer-centric" Ren Zhengfei.

Finally, refuse to do mobile phones. Now Huawei's mobile phones are in full swing. The P series, Mate series and glory series are sold well both at home and abroad, but few people know that Ren Zhengfei was the strongest opponent of Huawei's mobile phone. There were once executives who carefully advised that Ren Zhengfei was angry and slammed the table and said [3]: "When Huawei does not do mobile phones, it has already been decided, who will be nonsense, who will be laid off!" ”

These three mistakes made Huawei's triumphant victory in 2002 the first negative growth in 2002. The huge wireless product line (GSM and WCDMA) is not available in China and can only be expanded overseas. In 2001, Huawei held the “Overseas Swearing Conference” at Shenzhen Wuzhou Hotel, and Ren Zhengfei shouted:Sturdy, flamboyant, across the Pacific. The atmosphere of the meeting was bleak and chilly.

Compared with the crisis of the company's business, the bigger blow came from people around us: In 2000, Li Yi-nan, a subordinate who had relied heavily on for many years, left Huawei and quickly became a rival of Huawei. In 2001, Ren Zhengfei's mother suffered a car accident in Kunming and rushed back to China. I saw only the last side; in 2002, Zheng Bao fainted when he was at work, and was diagnosed with brain cancer. Ren Zhengfei personally sent his brother to the plane for treatment in the United States, crying when he left.

During this period, Ren Zhengfei also moved two cancer operations himself. Relatives, brothers, lovers, the body and the company's business suffered major changes in succession, and the cold wave soaked Ren Zhengfei.

The reforms, new policies, and reforms of the past and the present, from Wang Anshi to Zhang Juzhen, from the Qingli New Deal to the Westernization Movement, are basically “moving the standard”. Internal change is so difficult because it means redistributing benefits, solidified hills and circles are reluctant to give up vested interests, and will do everything possible to obstruct.When faced with cold snaps and setbacks, these reforms often stop and eventually fail to die.

However, Huawei’s reforms have not stopped, but they are gradually accelerating. At the same time that the R&D system reform is in full swing, Huawei's supply chain system, under the leadership of veteran Guo Ping, implemented IBM's advanced ISC (Integrated Supply Chain) system and reconstructed a series of orders, procurement, manufacturing, logistics, and delivery. Process. After the completion of the change, Huawei's inventory turnover rate increased significantly, and the order fulfillment cycle was shortened by nearly 50%.

Ren Zhengfei, who has made successive mistakes in decision-making, realized that his autocracy has become an obstacle to management. In 2003, at the age of 59, he decided not to love the relationship. With the help of Mercer Consulting, he introduced the management team (EMT) system and changed from a power to a collective decision of eight executives. Ren Zhengfei insisted on being an improper chairman and was rotated by eight members. In 2011, Huawei took a step further and implemented a rotating CEO system to further decentralize its power.

The last snow of the cold wave arrived in early 2003. On January 22, at this time only nine days from the Spring Festival, Cisco sued Huawei in the federal court of Marshall Township in eastern Texas for infringement of its intellectual property rights, alleging patents, copyrights, unfair competition, trade secrets and other 21 counts. The first encounter with Huawei's overseas expedition was launched.

After many years, people will find that when this encounter suddenly broke out, Huawei, which was firmly reformed in the cold wave, had already reborn, and the large-scale counterattacks on various fronts were already on the line.

3. Counterattack

On January 30, 2003, Guo Ping arrived in the United States as the front line commander of the battle with Cisco. Their New Year's Eve was a takeaway in a hotel.

When Guo Ping was studying at Huazhong University of Science and Technology, he first met Ren Zhengfei, the native of Shenzhen, in the mentor's office. At that time, Ren Zhengfei was alone in the switch, and he visited Guo Ping’s mentor [9]. After joining Huawei in 1988, he used his classmate Zheng Bao to bring him to Huawei, and Zheng Bao used his younger brother Li Yinan to pull into Huawei. Under this demonstration effect, Huazhong Polytechnic became the largest talent base of Huawei.

When Guo Ping led the team in the United States against Cisco, Zheng Bao used to undergo cancer surgery, and Li Yinan became Huawei's most worried local enemy. Li Yinan left in 2000 and started to act as an agent in the harbor. However, Li Yinan, a technical genius, was obviously ambitions. He quickly recruited and attacked Huawei’s core product areas, and dig a large number of employees of Huawei and ZTE. The confrontation of the East.

Ren Zhengfei is very worried about this. He later told Li Yinan and former Huawei employees in the harbor [10]: “From 2001 to 2002, Huawei was on the verge of internal and external difficulties and collapse. When you left, Huawei was very weak … … many insiders, imitating you to promote the company's division … in a group of forces, under the impetus of risk speculation, hand in stealing the company's technical secrets and trade secrets, Like a glorious ……”

In 2004, Huawei's famous “Hong Kong Office” was established to deal with the harbor. Outside of Cisco and the harbor, Huawei has targeted the third enemy — UT Starcom.

As mentioned above, Huawei made strategic mistakes in the field of PHS, which made UT Starcom take the opportunity to rise. In 2004, its peak revenue exceeded RMB 21.3 billion, and it invested heavily in research and development of 3G, posing a strong threat to Huawei. After 2003, Huawei management corrected Ren Zhengfei's mistakes, decided to enter the PHS and mobile phone field, and was unlocked by the unlocked wireless and terminal departments. The unfortunate UT Starcom became the first flag to be sacrificed.

After the internal management revolution, Huawei played a terrorist battle at this time.: In just 6 months, it broke through PHS technology and, with a powerful integrated supply chain system, pulled the price of the PHS handset to a staggering 300 (previously up to 2000). As a result, UT Starcom was quickly made a loss. In 2005, it lost 530 million US dollars. It had to endure the 3G product line and completely collapsed.

After the completion of UT Starcom in 2005, the next round was the port, and the strategy was simple and tragic. “After the establishment of the Hong Kong Office”, it was given the power to circumvent the IPD management system. As long as it is a project in the harbor, Huawei will adopt a strategy of almost white delivery. The knife is deadly, and the maximum annual cost is 400 million yuan. Hong Kong [10]. Under this attack, the harbor was forced to surrender and was acquired by Huawei in 2006.

In July 2006, "Chinese Entrepreneur" published a cover article "Don't, Harbour", Li Yinan on the cover was silent and tragic, and every Chinese technology company witnessing all of this was frightened.

If Huawei's process of dealing with UT Starcom and the harbor is somewhat “Chinese characteristics”, then in the process of dealing with Cisco, it shows a mature image that fully complies with and utilizes international rules. Before Guo Ping went to the United States, Ren Zhengfei said: "Learn Han Xin can bear the humiliation, as long as we can stand up. "When Guo Ping went to the United States, every time he went to a law firm, he asked: "If you lose, how much do we have to pay?" ”

In all kinds of unfavorable circumstances, Huawei is step by step. Guo Ping hired the famous American Shearman & Sterling and Heller Ehrman law firms [1] to deal with litigation and negotiation matters; and hired Edelman PR Worldwide to work together to develop a plan to guide public opinion and slowly reverse The overwhelming situation of Huawei’s early negative reports in the early days of Cisco’s lawsuit came out of the passive.

On the one hand, on the one hand, Huawei actively sent the source code of the disputed product to the US for inspection. The final tester concluded that Huawei did not find any infringement of Cisco. On the other hand, Huawei established a joint venture with the prestigious 3Com. Convince 3Com President Bruce Claflin to testify for Huawei and tell the court: He went to Huawei headquarters and inspected Huawei for 8 months. This is a trustworthy company.

With this “very American” response, Huawei won a reconciliation with Cisco. On July 28, 2004, the US court terminated the lawsuit against Huawei.

After 2003, Huawei slowly walked out of the winter, and at the same time, the battlefields in the Jedi counterattacks, so that a large number of core backbones have been trained, and Huawei's R&D, finance, manpower, supply chain and other systems are also being trained. Strengthened. After the stagnation of capital increase in 2000-2003, Huawei re-accelerated in 2004, with revenues exceeding RMB 46.2 billion, and in 2005 it exceeded RMB 66.7 billion.

At the same time as Huawei counterattacks, a policy of far-reaching significance to China is bearing the first fruits: in 2002, the first college students after the college enrollment in 1999 finally graduated. Since then, a large number of young people with higher education have rushed to the society. At that time, the media and public opinion were busy criticizing the decline in quality brought about by the expansion of enrollment and the difficulty of finding a job. The word "engineer bonus" was heard by few people.

The engineer is Ren Zhengfei's love, and Huawei even has a history of paying employees through loan sharks. In 1999, Ren Zhengfei went to Huawei for research at the North Research Institute. When asked, Liu Ping, the director of the company: "How come you are so a little bit here, isn't it a trick for you?" & rdquo; Liu Ping explained that there are more people who are afraid to do nothing. Ren Zhengfei said angrily: “I told you to recruit you. Nothing to do, recruit people to wash the sand. ”

For Huawei, which has built a giant company management structure, these cheap and easy-to-use science and engineering graduates are precious resources and treasures. Their footprints will grow in almost every corner of the world with the rise of overseas business.

4. Rise

Anhui Yu Chengdong has three characteristics: the sex is straight, the mouth is big, and the face is thick. When he was still an unknown ordinary employee, he dared to call someone else's landline to Ren Zhengfei [8]: boss, boss, I found a good thing, called CDMA! The next day, the president’s office called back the phone and asked: Who was the kid yesterday?

Yu Chengdong joined Huawei in 1993. He was almost invisible in the mass media before 2011. After serving as the head of Huawei's mobile phone in 2011, Yu Chengdong used social media such as Weibo to spray friends including Lei Jun into a media. The net called "red big mouth" & rdquo;. This superficially arrogant Huawei is actually known for an important resume:Leading Huawei's wireless division to capture Europe.

The history of the wireless sector of Huawei is the most important story of the rise of the Empire. The source needs to be traced back to 1998.

As mentioned above, Huawei's wireless department made 2G GSM equipment in 1998, invested 1.6 billion yuan in research and development, and has been unable to break through the market and was forced to go overseas. The same thing happened in 3G WCDMA equipment. In 1998, Yucheng Dongla team engaged in 3G pre-research and invested more than 4 billion. In 2001, the product was made. However, due to the delay in issuing 3G licenses in China, Huawei's wireless product line suffered serious losses.

When Ren Zhengfei met the person in charge of the wireless product, he often asked: “When can you get me back 6 billion?"Xin Zhijun, President of Wireless Products and Yu Chengdong, Director of 3G Products, are under tremendous pressure. In this context, overseas markets have become a lifeline for the wireless sector. The first stop of 3G products went to Hong Kong. In order to win the first battle, Huawei simply made an amazing move:Spend money to buy an order!

Although Hong Kong is a projectile, it has a huge influence and can stand on it. The benchmark is self-evident. A carrier called Sunday has a scarce WCDMA license in hand. In order to get the company's 3G order, Huawei did the following three things: 1. Borrowing HKD 500 million to pay off debt; 2. Boring Sunday 8.59 HK$ billion was used to buy Huawei equipment; 3. It was heavily invested to become the second shareholder of Sunday.

In this way, Huawei got the list of Sunday and successfully made it a benchmark case to promote it to customers around the world. Soon Huawei got the second order: the WCDMA-3G network of Etisalat of UAE Telecom, and then the third and fourth orders came one after another. By 2005, Huawei's overseas revenue exceeded $5 billion, although the gap with Ericsson is still huge, but it is already of the same order of magnitude.

What really made Huawei change is a product called Single-RAN, which is a legendary work in the history of Huawei's R&D.

In 2007, Vodafone hoped to achieve a “smooth evolution from GSM to 3G”. This high-sentence sentence is explained in the vernacular: how to use the cheapest method to retain both 2G and 3G. service. The “multi-carrier technology” involved in this is very difficult to achieve, but in the end, Yu Chengdong withstood the pressure board: all the power of the wireless department to meet the requirements of customers.

Huawei's R&D management system once again exerted its power and called global resources including algorithm experts from Huawei Russia Institute. It took more than a year to overcome multi-carrier technology and make SingleRAN products come out. This product is a revolutionary innovative product that can help users save a lot of money, sweeping almost all operators in Europe, making wireless products revenue rank second in the world, approaching Ericsson.

With the help of the wireless sector, Huawei's total revenue exceeded RMB 200 billion in 2011. This is a figure that everyone is admired.

Behind this is Huawei's strong institutional guarantee. After Huawei's 2 billion IPD and ISC systems were gradually matured, Ren Zhengfei did not stop and continued to introduce various advanced management systems: In 2005, all overseas branches were promoted to engage in ERP systems, and all implementations were completed by the end of 2007. In 2007, with the help of IBM, the implementation of Integrated Financial Services (IFS) led by Meng Xiazhou.

This is a company that is very jealous of the United States, but it is also a company that learns to grow up in the United States.

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